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Memorandum to Secretary of Defense,
James V. Forrestal, on Subversive
Warfare from William J. Donovan.

1. To protect our prestige abroad and our unity at home from attacks by the Soviet Union, open recognition (in such form as would best enable the American people to understand) should be given of the existence of subversive warfare against us by the employment of psychological, economic and political measures.
2. In order properly to estimate the entire situation it would be necessary to analyze the subversive operations of the Soviet Union in those countries where it and the United States face each other in Europe and Asia and to consider those means which we could best employ to counter the moves of the Soviet Union and to initiate psychological, economic and political attacks against it.
3. Our purpose should be to take the initiative in asserting our world leadership by supporting those political forces that are resisting subjugation and by continuing our support of resistant groups within the countries already taken over by the Communists.
4. Assuming that the most immediate requirements lie in the West, we should realize that (1) it will be necessary to deal with the problems of Eastern Europe by clandestine means and that (2) with Western Europe it would be possible and desirable to develop a program to be carried out openly, aggressively and with the clear assertion that all who are not with us are against us.
5. To develop the clandestine means for Eastern Europe there are here in America particular individuals from Romania, Hungary, Poland and

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Czechoslovakia whose knowledge and experience could be available, and for Western Europe there are Americans with working contacts especially in France and Italy who would be of great value.

6. The thole-pin of Eastern and Western Europe is Austria and already there are officers and civilians who have served in that country and could be used in the development of a plan to resist the pressure now applied by the Soviet Union to drive out the American army.

7. The Scandinavian countries are in a different category. It would seem a wise and effective move to send as our Minister to Sweden a man who is engaged in labor activities at home and is sympathetic to those labor movements abroad in the fight against Communists. I believe word of such an appointment would run like wild fire throughout all of Europe, as it would give an answer to the Communist charge against us of "reactionary."

8. Labor is the striking head in Europe in its fight against Communistic control of the labor unions. The weapons needed for this kind of warfare are gasoline - printing presses - news print - and most of all a news service which would furnish information on the psychological and political front. Consideration must be given to the best method of handling these facilities.

9. Under the Second Decontrol Act of 1947 broad powers are vested in the Secretary of Commerce to exercise export controls. If the Marshall Plan is to be successful, it must be buttressed by measures which will insure that the population of Europe know where and how and why America is doing it. Also export controls must play a significant part in the fulfillment of the plan and preferential treatment for cooperating nations implies something less than preferential treatment for other nations.

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10. In the last analysis, the use of the export control machinery to deny American goods to unfriendly countries must be dependent upon our political policy in regard to those countries.

11. The United States is the largest supplier of materials which are in great scarcity and if it were, for example, to embargo the shipment of steel mill products to Russia (especially the shipment of heavy material items such as metal binding machinery, electrical machinery and apparatus) the result would affect the reconstruction of the Soviet Union.

12. Any economic sanction should include a control over the activities of technical personnel from Russia to the United States and also a limitation in the number of Russians who enter this country on official missions to the number of Americans who are allowed to visit Russia.

13. The above limitation is particularly important in the necessary effort to cut down on the Soviet penetration of American organizations. Our people do not seem to appreciate that there is a pattern of activity of the Communist which is an essential part of the Soviet Union strategy and tied into its other operations. The Russians have made the United Nations a base for its propaganda and an operational center for its subversive movements here under leaders with diplomatic immunity.

14. Radio has a vital function in the use of propaganda. The purchase of time in Radio Luxembourg and the installation of a radio station in Western Europe could be of great practical value. While American broadcasts could supplement those of the countries concerned, the accent must be made by those countries who are fighting with us.

15. I quote a paragraph from Tito's speech as reported in The New York Times on September 29th as an official announcement of what we must meet:

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"Insufficient courage and determination had been shown by Communists in some countries. An armed struggle is needed when public demonstrations are impossible . . . The Communist leaders lack confidence on the people's fronts, have not been militant."

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8 March 1948

Major General William J. Donovan
2 Wall Street
New York 5, New York

Dear General Donovan:

25X1 In compliance with your request to my representative,
[redacted] I am pleased to forward a list of the deco-
rations awarded to the Office of Strategic Services' person-
nel and foreign nationals associated with that organization,
as compiled from the OSS files.

It is probable that this list is not complete since
copies of all orders effecting the awards undoubtedly did
not reach the Citations Office for recording. However, it
contains all of the awards for which official notification
was received.

Sincerely,

SIGNED: *Dep 3/9*

R. H. HUNTER
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE


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Lec: Director's Files

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File: Donovan, Wm. J.

ROOM 5600
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.



August 9, 1957

Dear Allen:

I apologize for bothering you again. However, any reactions to the attached that your shop would be willing to give me would be much appreciated and kept completely in confidence.

With many thanks and best wishes,

Sincerely,


Nelson A. Rockefeller

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

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